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I. Introduction. 
The recent twin financial crises have turned the spotlight on asset prices and the sources of 
corporate borrowing in Europe. Since 2007 the financial press has observed and regularly 
commented upon two trends that are slowly changing the traditional financial landscape of 
Europe. First, private-sector companies are increasingly turning towards the bond market to 
raise financial capital, especially during times of financial strain. The move towards bond 
financing may only be temporary though since traditionally European firms have relied 
predominantly on bank loans as a source of finance.
1
 Only a few years ago, in the first quarter 
of 2007, the volume of bank loans exceeded bond issuance fivefold. Two years later, in the 
midst of the Global Financial Crisis, bonds began to dominate bank loans as a source of 
corporate funding. But bank loans did recover their premier status as the effects of the crisis 
receded. In the first quarter of 2012 European firms again tapped more into the bond market 
than commercial banks, borrowing US$179.5 billion on the bond market compared to $112.9 
billion from banks.
2
 Second, the financial landscape of Europe is becoming again more 
fragmented, a sign that the process of financial integration has been disrupted. In the wake of 
the Global Financial Crisis and the Sovereign Debt Crisis, borrowing costs in the countries on 
the European periphery have increased dramatically relative to the cost of borrowing in the 
centre of Europe. Firms in southern European countries and Ireland have faced higher interest 
rates than firms in Germany because risk premia in the weaker economies on the periphery 
have surged relative to the centre and because credit conditions have been tighter in the 
former compared to the latter. In November 2010, companies in Spain, Portugal and Ireland 
were virtually shut out of the corporate bond market when fear of sovereign default spilled 
from the sovereign debt market to the corporate debt market.
3
 Bank credit, too, has been 
                                                 
1. Wall Street Journal, “Bonds with Banks Fraying,” April 10, 2012. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Financial Times, “European Company Borrowing Costs Rise,” November 30, 2010. The 
article reports that “the last bond issue from a company domiciled in Spain, Portugal or 
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squeezed in the periphery countries as banks in central and northern Europe have taken steps 
to cut back their cross-border exposure.
4
 As a direct consequence of the Sovereign Debt 
Crisis, corporate borrowing rates on bank loans in Spain and Italy have risen much faster than 
in Germany. Indeed in the third quarter of 2012 they stood at 6.5 % and 6.24 %, respectively, 
their highest level in both countries since late 2008 while in Germany the rate was just 4.04 
% and thus only slightly above its minimum since late 2008.
5
 
This paper examines whether information from bond markets provides a reliable signal for 
future economic activity in Europe. It evaluates the marginal predictive content and economic 
significance of a risk-adjusted credit spread in five European countries from the early 1990s 
to the recent past. Following the lead of the financial press, we distinguish between the peri-
phery and the centre of Europe. Four countries - Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain - are 
members of the European periphery while Germany represents the centre of Europe.
6
 The 
credit spread is defined as the average of yields on outstanding corporate bonds in a country 
on the European periphery less a riskless yield. The riskless yield is computed using data 
from the zero-coupon curve of German government bonds (Bunds). German Bunds are thus 
deemed to be safe havens. The intuition behind the credit spread is straightforward. In times 
of financial stress, credit conditions tighten. The supply of credit decreases because the cred-
itworthiness of firms deteriorates. The risk premium on privately issued bonds rises, leading 
to a widening in the spread between risky private bond yields and the riskless yield.
7
 Worsen-
ing credit conditions in turn reduce spending and consequently real economic activity 
declines.
8
 
The inclusion of the bond yield spread (henceforth called GZ-spread because it follows the 
“bottom-up” approach proposed by Gilchrist and Zakrašjek (2012)) improves markedly the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Ireland came from Iberdrola, the Spanish utility, on October 6th.” Thus no corporate bond 
placement was effected in almost two months. 
4. Financial Times, “Loan Rates Point to Eurozone Fractures,” September 3, 2012. The rates 
quoted are the average rate on loans to non-financial corporations, 1-5 years, up to € 1 
million in value. 
5. Ibid. 
6. Ideally, we would have included Greece in our examination. Unfortunately, data 
constraints made this impossible.  
7. This is the gist of the Financial Accelerator effect (Bernanke and Gilchrist (1996), 
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999)). For a non-technical analysis , see Bernanke and 
Gertler (1995). 
8. The healthiness of financial intermediaries may deteriorate as well. Shrinking balance 
sheets reduce the size of loan portfolios, driving up other credit spreads such as the LIBOR 
- OIS spread. 
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goodness of fit of the forecasting equation for economic activity in countries on the European 
periphery.
9
 The within-sample forecasting ability of the GZ-spread is remarkable, both over 
the whole sample period and a sub-sample period marking the effective beginning of the 
Economic and Monetary Union of Europe (EMU) in 1999. Indeed since the establishment of 
the EMU its economic significance in predicting future economic activity has increased in 
most countries on the European periphery that have been hit hard by the recent turmoil in 
financial markets. The marginal predictive content of the GZ-spread for changes in economic 
activity in these countries is impressive even after accounting for the effect of standard 
monetary policy measures such as the slope of the term spread and a short-term money 
market rate.  
Like Gilchrist and Zakrašjek (2012), we also examine the predictive content of a country-
specific GZ-spread. The GZ-spread constructed for Germany consists of the difference 
between the yields on German corporate bonds and the riskless German Bund yield.
10
 The 
predictive ability of the “internal” GZ-spread for economic activity in Germany is spotty. The 
GZ-spread matters for the growth rate of industrial production and real GDP over some 
horizons but appears to have no bearing on future changes in the rate of unemployment. 
In the next section, we explain in greater detail the calculation of the GZ-type spread that is 
used in the forecasting equation. Section III presents summary statistics of the data and the 
GZ-spread. The specification of the forecasting equation is explained in detail in Section IV. 
                                                 
9. There has been a long-standing interest in the predictive ability of various financial 
indicators for economic activity and inflation. Among the most frequently used proxies for 
monetary conditions are the yield spread on long-term and short-term government bonds 
(Bernanke (1988), Harvey (1988), Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991), and others) and the risk 
spread, defined as the difference between the yield on short-term commercial paper and the 
yield on Treasury Bills of the same maturity (Friedman and Kuttner (1992), (1998), Emery 
(1996)). Moersch (1996) finds that money market spreads predict output better than other 
spreads along the yield curve. Various US bond yield spreads (long-term, high yield) figure 
prominently in Gertler and Lown (1999), Mody and Taylor (2004) and King et al (2007). 
De Bondt (2004) analyses bond yield spreads in Europe. More recent contributions such as 
Mueller (2009) also examine corporate bond yield spreads defined along rating categories 
in the context of a macro-finance term structure model of the type proposed by Ang, 
Piazzesi, and Wei (2006). A comprehensive survey of the literature on the role of asset 
prices in forecasting economic activity is by Stock and Watson (2003).  
10. Bleaney, Mizen, and Veleanu (2012) compose country-specific GZ-spreads in the spirit 
of Gilchrist and Zakrašjek (2012) for a number of European countries. Their analysis of 
the predictive content of credit spreads differs from ours in three important respects. They 
are: construction of the GZ-spread, countries included in the study, and estimation 
method. According to the findings of their panel data study, the GZ-spread is a reliable 
predictor of future economic activity in Europe.  
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The predictive content of the GZ-spread and standard measures of monetary policy for 
economic activity is examined in Section V. Section VI offers a brief conclusion. 
 
 
II. Calculation of the GZ-Spread. 
Except for the German GZ-spread, our method of constructing the GZ-spread is somewhat 
different from the one proposed by Gilchrist and Zakrašjek (2012). Our method uses rates 
from the German zero curve as reference rates to calculate the price of a riskless bond in a 
country on the European periphery. This synthetic bond has the same coupon schedule as a 
given corporate bond issued in a country on the European periphery.  Unlike Gilchrist and 
Zakrašjek, we exclude bonds with embedded options.   
The procedure we follow to calculate the GZ-spread comprises two parts. First, we calculate 
the monthly spread between the yield on corporate bond j in country a and the risk-free 
German yield at time t. Second, we calculate the GZ-spread at the country level by averaging 
the individual bond spreads in country a in a given month. This procedure is set out in detail 
below. 
We first obtain monthly yield-to-redemption data on senior, unsecured corporate bonds from 
DataStream for every country in our sample (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Spain and 
Germany).Our sample period begins in 1990 shortly after German reunification, and spans 
the transition to the Economic and Monetary Union and the Global Financial Crisis before 
finishing in 2012 in the midst of the Sovereign Debt Crisis. Like Gilchrist and Zakrašjek, we 
include bonds of only non-financial firms. 
Next, we obtain the risk-free rate which we use to create the GZ spread at the ‘bond level’.  
In order to obtain a risk-free rate without ‘duration bias,’ we require a German risk-free bond 
with the same coupon schedule as corporate bond j in month t. Of course no such bond exists, 
so we follow Gilchrist and Zakrašjek and create a ‘synthetic risk-free bond’. This synthetic 
bond, in effect, is a German federal government bond with the same coupon schedule at time 
t as corporate bond j.   
 To find the yield for the synthetic German security which matches corporate bond j in month 
t, we first need to calculate its price. The price of corporate bond j in a given country at time 
t,    
    
, is calculated by applying the discount function, D(t) to a stream of s regular coupon 
payments where C(s): s =1, 2…S ,  (  )    
     and ‘r’ is the yield to maturity:   
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      ∑ ( ) (  )
 
 
 
The price    
         
of a synthetic German security at time t can be found by discounting 
C(s) using s zero coupon risk-free interest rates. That is,   (  )    
       where      is the 
German zero rate at time t with a maturity m corresponding to the time until coupon payment 
s. For example, to find the price of the synthetic risk-free bond that corresponds to a 
corporate bond that pays one coupon six months from today (time t) and matures in twelve 
months, one performs the following calculation (assume coupon rate is 5% and last coupon is 
paid at maturity with principal $1000): 
   
                                        
where 
          today’s interest rate on a German zero coupon bond with a maturity of six months 
(0.5 of a year). 
          today’s interest rate on a German zero coupon bond with a maturity of twelve 
months. 
        
      
   
           the price of a synthetic risk-free security.  
Note coupons are paid semi-annually in the example. 
We obtain      from a German zero curve downloaded from the Bundesbank website. For 
each month, the zero curve plots German zero securities of ascending maturity (six months 
up to thirty years in yearly intervals from one year up) on the x-axis and their corresponding 
yields on the y-axis. Where necessary, we linearly interpolate to get the risk-free discount rate 
with the exact same maturity as a given coupon payment. 
Once we have the price of the German synthetic bond, we numerically solve for the yield-to-
maturity (this is just the internal rate of return). The result,    
         
 is the risk-free portion 
of the ‘bond-level’ spread for bond j at time t. 
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Next, we calculate the risk-free rate for every bond in our sample using the method described 
above.  
We then subtract the risk-free rate from the yield on corporate bond j at time t in country a. 
The result,    
 , is the spread at the ‘bond level’:  
   
      
          
         
 
The final step is to average the spread in country a at time t to create the GZ-spread    
  at 
the country level:  
   
  
 
  
∑   
 
 
 
    the number of bond observations in month t.  
For example, to find the Italian GZ spread in January 2007, average all of available 
observations of the Italian bond level spreads in that month. Thus the credit spread is 
representative of the entire maturity and credit quality spectrum as emphasized by Gilchrist 
and Zakrašjek (2012). We also follow their example of eliminating from the sample bonds 
with remaining terms of maturity of less than one year or more than 30 years. In the same 
vein, extreme observations of the GZ-spread, i.e. those below 0.05 percent or above 35 
percent were scrapped from the sample. 
 
 
III. The GZ-Spread in the Centre and on the Periphery of Europe: Basic Facts. 
Table 1A provides summary statistics of the data used in the empirical analysis. The number 
of bond-issuing firms varies from a low of 13 for Ireland and Portugal to a high of 62 for 
Germany. The number of corporate bonds issued during the sample period, which is country-
specific, ranges from a low of 42 for Portugal to a high 330 for Germany. The mean yield is 
highest in Ireland and lowest in Germany.
11
 The mean maturity at issue of bonds is far longer 
in Spain (11.81 yrs.) and Ireland (12.76 yrs.) than in Germany where it is slightly below 
seven years.
12
 Summary statistics of the GZ-spread for Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and 
                                                 
11 It may seem strange that corporate bonds issued by Irish firms enjoy the highest credit 
rating. It must be borne in mind, however, that credit ratings are not available for all firms 
at all times.  
12 The maturity profile of corporate bonds included in the sample corresponds broadly to that 
reported by the European Central Bank in its February 2012 Bulletin. Over the 1999-2007 
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Spain appear in Table 1B. Data limitations for Spain and Portugal restrict a cross-country 
comparison of the summary statistics over the 1990-2012 sample period to Italy, Ireland, and 
Germany. The GZ-spread can be calculated for Spain only from 1996 onward; for Portugal 
the GZ-spread starts even later, in April 1999. 
Inspection of Table 1B.1 reveals that the GZ-spread is considerably lower and less variable in 
Germany compared to Italy and Ireland over the whole sample period.  Comparing Tables 
1B.2 and 1B.3, we observe that the period since the start of the Economic and Monetary 
Union in 1999 has seen a lower and more stable GZ-spread in Italy and Ireland.
13
 Since 1999, 
the volatility of the GZ-spread has been reduced by half in Germany while its mean has risen 
slightly compared to the pre-1999 period. Breaking down the EMU Period into a pre-Crisis 
(1999:01-2007:07) period and a Crisis period (2007:08-2012:08) shows that during the Crisis 
period the mean of the GZ-spread rises in all five countries. The rise is most pronounced in 
Portugal where the GZ-spread surges upward by almost 300 basis points, followed by 
Ireland, Spain, and Italy while in Germany the GZ-spread ratchets upward by only 80 basis 
points. Large increases in the variability of the GZ-spread are observed in Portugal and Spain. 
Even in Germany the standard deviation of the GZ-spread nearly doubles during the Crisis 
period. Notice though that the GZ-spread peaks during the Crisis period only in Portugal, 
Spain, and Ireland when all observations over the whole sample period are taken into 
account. Evidently, during the Crisis period credit conditions worsen by more in the smaller 
and medium-size economies on the periphery relative to the larger ones. 
The GZ-Spread during Recessions  
Figures 1 - 5 track the behaviour of the GZ-spread in the five countries over the respective 
sample period. The individual graphs show clearly that the GZ-spread is at quite elevated 
levels in Ireland and Italy at the beginning of the 1990s and in Germany from 1992 to the first 
quarter of 1996.
14
 The spread is also relatively high initially in Spain before it drops off 
markedly in 1997. The GZ-spread never rises above 200 basis points and is relatively stable 
in Portugal before the Crisis period. Most importantly, however, the five graphs show the 
                                                                                                                                                        
period the average maturity of corporate bonds was shortest in Germany at 4.7 years and 
highest in Ireland at 8.8 years. 
13. Strictly speaking, January 1, 1999 marks the beginning of the third stage of the Economic 
and Monetary Union. On this date the Euro officially replaced the Ecu as the official 
currency of the union. For the first three years the Euro served only as a unit of account. 
Euro coins and banknotes were not introduced until January 1, 2002. 
14. For Germany one also observes a steep increase in the GZ-spread in 1998 around the time 
of the Russian Default. 
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countercyclical behaviour of the GZ-spread: it tends to rise before recessions begin and 
surges dramatically during recessions when perceived risk increases. The recessions appear 
as shaded areas in each figure. The CEPR Business Cycle Committee has identified three 
European-wide recessions over the 1991-2012 sample period. The beginning and end of each 
recession are:
15
 
1992 Q1 – 1993 Q3 2008 Q1 – 2009 Q2 2011 Q3 – end of sample period. 
The Crisis period includes two recessions. As a result there are twin peaks in the GZ-spread 
during the Crisis period.  Notice, however, that there is no clear-cut, systematic evidence 
across the five countries that the GZ-spread widens more during the Sovereign Debt Crisis 
than the Global Financial Crisis (or vice versa). It is true that the former crisis causes far 
greater surges in the GZ-Spread than the latter in Portugal and Spain and a slightly larger 
spike in Italy but the pattern is just the reverse for Germany and Ireland where larger 
increases in the GZ-spread are manifest during the Global Financial Crisis compared to the 
Sovereign Debt Crisis.  
 
 
IV. The Forecasting Specification. 
To assess the predictive ability of the GZ-credit spread, we employ a specification similar but 
not exactly the same as the one adopted by Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012). A significant 
difference between their specification and ours results from our using a multiple country 
framework with an alternative definition of the GZ-spread, an interaction term involving the 
GZ-spread, and the inclusion of cross-country effects of inflation. In other respects the 
specification of the forecasting equation is the same. The annualized growth rate of the 
economic indicator at a given forecast horizon,    
   
  is regressed on the lagged annualized 
growth rate of itself, standard measures of monetary policy, the GZ-credit spread, and an 
inflation differential: 
 
          ∑                 
 
                          (    
     
    
   )        
(1) 
 
                                                 
15. The first recession preceded Black Wednesday in September 1992 when the European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism came under attack. The second recession was triggered off by 
the Global Financial Crisis while the third came upon the heels of the European Sovereign 
Debt Crisis.  
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   (
    
    
)  h = 3, 6, 12 (forecast horizon, monthly data) c = 1200 for monthly data 
          h = 1, 2, 4 (forecast horizon, quarterly data) c = 400 for quarterly data 
    
    = Term spread defined as the difference between the yield on 10-year government bonds 
and the yield on 1-year government paper.  
    = Inflation adjusted short-term interest rate. The real short term interest rate is defined as 
the 90-day Euribor (or short-term government yield before EMU) less CPI inflation. 
The annual rate of CPI inflation is calculated as     (               ) where k 
=12 for monthly data and 4 for quarterly data. 
    = credit spread as defined in the previous section. 
     = Dummy variable. It is defined as:  
        for 2007:08 – 2012:04 (referred to as the Crisis period)  
        otherwise. 
    
         
    = Difference between the rate of inflation in home country and Germany.  
According to conventional wisdom, a tightening of monetary policy leads to a flattening of 
the yield curve, a decrease in the term spread, and a subsequent decrease in economic 
activity. Increases in the short-term real interest rate and future economic activity are 
inversely related. Increases in the GZ-spread reflect a tightening of credit conditions in 
financial markets and foreshadow a downturn in economic activity. We are agnostic about the 
effects of higher relative inflation on future economic activity. On the one hand, higher 
inflation in the home country relative to Germany is expected to harm the growth prospects 
of the home country as higher relative inflation imparts a competitive cost disadvantage and 
increases transaction costs. On the other hand, higher relative inflation in the home country 
may be a signal that the home country is in an expansionary phase of the business cycle.  
 
 
V. The Predictive Ability of the GZ-Credit Spread. 
In this section we employ the forecasting specification described in the previous section to 
examine the predictive ability of the GZ-spread alongside standard monetary policy 
indicators. Tables 2 - 7 report the econometric results of our empirical analysis. The findings 
12 
 
of the first four tables are based on monthly data. Quarterly results are reported in Tables 6 
and 7.  
Monthly Economic Indicators 
Tables 2 – 5 present statistical evidence on the forecasting ability of the GZ-spread and 
standard measures of monetary policy for industrial production and the rate of unemployment 
for the whole sample period and a sub-sample period which marks the effective beginning of 
the Economic and Monetary Union in 1999. The forecasting horizon is one month, three 
months, and twelve months, respectively.  
According to Table 2, the two standard measures of monetary policy, the term spread and the 
real short-term interest rate, have predictive power for industrial production in two of the four 
countries considered over the whole sample period. The term spread has a strong positive 
effect on industrial production across all three forecasting horizons in Spain and Germany. 
There is also an inverse relationship between real economic activity and the inflation adjusted 
short-term rate in Spain and Germany, albeit the respective effect on industrial production 
through the short-term real interest rate channel is weaker, both economically and 
statistically, compared to the slope of the yield curve. For Italy and Ireland there is neither 
econometric evidence of a positive relationship between the term spread and industrial 
production nor evidence of an inverse relationship between the real rate of interest and 
industrial production. The inflation differential relative to Germany exercises a sizeable 
negative effect on industrial production across all three forecasting horizons in Spain and at 
the 12-month horizon in Ireland.
16
  
The marginal predictive effect of the credit spread on industrial production is captured by the 
coefficients of GZ and GZ*DUM. The coefficient of the latter regressor captures the distinct 
marginal effect of the GZ-spread during the Crisis period set off by the outbreak of the 
Global Financial Crisis in August 2007 and lengthened by the Sovereign Debt Crisis in 
Europe. Our empirical results suggest that increases in the GZ-spread proper predict lower 
industrial production only in Ireland across all forecasting horizons prior to the Crisis period. 
With the onset of the Global Financial Crisis, however, the negative effect of the GZ-spread 
on industrial production is widely felt in Spain, Italy, and Ireland and Germany at the 12-
month forecasting horizon as evidenced by the negative and statistically significant 
                                                 
16. The estimated coefficient on the relative inflation differential is reported only if it is 
statistically significant. 
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coefficient on GZ*DUM. The most compelling evidence for a significant change in the 
predictive ability of the GZ-spread during the Crisis period is found in Spain where its 
material effect on economic activity relative to the pre-Crisis period is evident at all 
forecasting horizons. Indeed, the marginal impact of the spread in Spain is extreme: a one 
percent increase in the spread predicts roughly a seven percent decline in the (annualized) 
growth rate of industrial production.   
To get a clearer picture of the overall predictive effect of the GZ-spread during the Crisis 
period, we carry out a simple Wald test of the sum of the coefficients on the GZ-spread and 
the interaction term. The sixth row of Table 2 reports the outcome of this test. The sum of the 
coefficients on GZ and GZ*DUM is negative and statistically significant in the three 
countries on the European periphery.  This result holds at all forecasting horizons. The effects 
of a widening credit spread are also apparent in Germany where a 100 basis increase in the 
GZ-spread predicts an almost 3 per cent decline in the growth rate of industrial production at 
the 12 month forecasting horizon. Indeed, three observations are noteworthy. First, the 
economic significance of widening credit spreads during the Crisis period is remarkable with 
the sum of the coefficients ranging from -2.44 to well over -4 in the countries on the 
periphery. Thus, a widening of the GZ-spread by 100 basis points predicts a decrease of up to 
4.5 percent in the growth rate of industrial production. Second, the economic significance of 
the GZ-spread is underscored further by a comparison of the goodness of fit measure in 
forecasting equations with and without (in bold face) the GZ-spread. Comparing the entries 
of rows seven and eight in Table 2, we find the adjusted R
2
 drops massively – often by 50 
percent or more – if the GZ-spread is omitted from the forecasting equation. Third, in all 
countries the credit spread appears to exercise a greater effect on the future growth rate of 
industrial production than the standard measures of monetary policy.   
Table 3 summarizes the findings for the unemployment rate. Only in Spain is the term spread 
an excellent predictor of changes in the unemployment rate across all three horizons. The 
level of the real short-term money market rate reliably predicts future changes in the 
unemployment rate in Italy at all forecasting horizons while it does so in Germany only at the 
12-month horizon. Increases in the inflation differential are positively related to future 
increases in the unemployment rate in Ireland at all three forecasting horizons but less so for 
Spain where the inflation differential predicts future changes in the unemployment rate at the 
3-month and marginally at the 6-month horizon.  In Italy the effect of the inflation differential 
14 
 
on the rate of unemployment rate is strongly negative, particularly at the 12-month horizon. 
This suggests the existence of a Phillips curve effect in Italy.  
Just as in the case of industrial production, the GZ-spread appears to have exercised a 
stronger effect on the rate of unemployment during the Crisis period. Increases in the GZ-
spread during the Crisis period predict higher unemployment rates in Spain, Italy, and Ireland 
at all forecasting horizons: Wald tests of the significance of the sum of the coefficients on the 
GZ-spread and GZ*DUM, reported in the sixth row, attest to the strong predictive ability of 
the GZ-spread during the Crisis period. The marginal effect of the GZ-spread during the 
Crisis period rises markedly in line with the length of the forecasting horizon in Spain, 
peaking at 1.51 at the 12 month horizon. A similar pattern is observed in Ireland though the 
marginal positive impact of credit spread increases on future unemployment rates during the 
Crisis period is distinctly smaller, peaking at 0.70 at the 12-month horizon. In Italy the 
marginal effect of the GZ-spread during the Crisis period stays relatively constant over the 
three forecasting horizons, falling into the 0.5-0.6 range. There is no econometric evidence 
that the GZ-spread has any predictive ability for the unemployment rate in Germany. Overall, 
the economic significance of the GZ-spread as a driving factor of future changes in the rate of 
unemployment is markedly weaker compared to industrial production. Only in Italy and in 
Ireland at the 12-month horizon does the omission of the GZ-spread and its interaction term 
result in a substantial drop in the goodness of fit of the forecasting equation. 
 
The EMU-Period 
The effective start of the Economic and Monetary Union in January 1999 transformed the 
financial landscape of Europe. This date saw the introduction of the Euro and, importantly, 
set in motion a process aiming at even closer financial integration of the European Union. 
The purpose of this section is to examine whether the effect of the GZ-credit spread on 
economic activity intensified as a result of the establishment of the EMU at the turn of the 
millennium. Portugal now joins the list of countries for which this analysis is undertaken.  
Inspection of Table 4 reveals that from 1999 to 2012 the predictive ability of equation (1) for 
the growth rate of industrial production improves markedly only in Italy. The adjusted R
2 
rises substantially across all three forecasting horizons. Notice further that the sum of the 
coefficients on the GZ-spread and the interaction term in Italy (reported in the sixth row) 
more than doubles during the EMU period compared to the whole sample period. This result 
holds at all forecasting horizons and underscores the extraordinary importance of the credit 
15 
 
spread as a predictor of future economic activity in Italy during the Crisis period since the 
start of the currency union. For Portugal the results are less clear. On the one hand, there is 
strong evidence of a connection between increases in the GZ-spread and future changes in 
economic activity at the 6-month and 12-month horizon, particularly during the Crisis period. 
On the other hand, the economic significance of the GZ-spread as a predictor appears to be 
low as the adjusted R
2
 of the forecasting equation without the GZ-spread is about the same as 
the one with it included. For the other countries, the economic significance of the GZ-spread 
remains unscathed as the goodness of fit of the forecasting equation without the spread 
decreases markedly.   
We also observe notable changes in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and the 
predictive ability of the GZ-spread in more recent times. According to Table 4, changes have 
been particularly acute in Germany. The results of the Wald test reported in row 6 suggest 
that the credit spread exercises an immense effect on changes in industrial production at the 
3-month horizon during the Crisis period; this effect wanes, however, both in terms of 
economic and statistical significance as the forecasting horizon increases.  What is interesting 
about Germany (and Ireland) is that the forecasting ability of the GZ-credit spread at the 3-
month horizon is not limited to the Crisis period but holds throughout the EMU period. In 
marked contrast, at the 12-month horizon the marginal effect of the GZ-spread on future 
industrial production seems entirely confined to the Crisis period in Germany. Furthermore, 
in Germany the interest rate channel also seems more potent while the term spread loses its 
predictive power altogether during the EMU period.  
Table 5 reports the results for the forecasting equation where the rate of unemployment is the 
dependent variable. Again we observe that for Italy the predictive ability of the forecasting 
equation is markedly better during the EMU period than over the whole sample period and 
that the effect of the GZ-spread on future changes in the unemployment rate appears to be 
stronger during the EMU period than before. Indeed in Italy movements in the GZ-spread 
predict changes in the unemployment rate at the 3-month and 6-month horizon, respectively, 
well before the start of the Crisis period; the effects of these movements in the GZ-spread on 
future unemployment intensify during the Crisis period. In Portugal the results suggest that a 
one percentage point increase in the credit spread during the Crisis period is associated with 
roughly a one percentage point increase in the rate of unemployment at the 3-month and 6-
month horizon. For Germany we detect no systematic relationship between the GZ-spread 
and the rate of unemployment during the EMU period. Overall, the economic significance of 
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the GZ-spread remains strong during the EMU period in Spain, Italy, Ireland and Portugal as 
evidenced by the substantial decrease in the adjusted R
2
 of the forecasting equation without 
the GZ-spread and the interaction term. 
Quarterly Results 
The marginal predictive effect of the GZ-spread is also tested on quarterly observations of 
real GDP. Tables 6 and 7 present the econometric results for the whole sample period and the 
EMU period, respectively. Overall, the findings of Table 6, which attest to a firm link 
between the GZ-spread and the growth rate of GDP over 1, 2, and 4 quarters, amplify the 
monthly results between the GZ-spread and industrial production. The GZ-spread predicts 
future economic growth in Italy and Ireland.
17
 During the Crisis period the negative 
predictive effect on future economic activity intensifies in Italy and Ireland and particularly 
in Spain. In the latter country the negative impact effect on GDP growth of a rise in the GZ-
spread during the Crisis period increases in line with the forecasting horizon, peaking at 
slightly over -1.85% for a 1% increase in the GZ-spread. In the three peripheral countries, the 
effect of the GZ-spread on real GDP growth at different forecasting horizons falls between -1 
and -2.3% during the Crisis period. For Germany there is no detectable link between the GZ 
spread and real GDP growth. 
Evidence of the importance of the GZ-spread during the shorter EMU period is found in all 
countries.
18
 The effect of the GZ-spread on future real activity during the Crisis period is 
undeniably strong at all three forecasting horizons in all five countries except Germany at the 
four-quarter horizon: the sum-of-coefficients Wald tests reported in the fifth row of Table 7 
clearly reject the null hypothesis that the GZ-spread during the Crisis period exercises no 
effect on future GDP growth rates. However, there are slight differences across the countries 
in the way the GZ-spread exercises the predicted negative effect on the growth rate of real 
GDP. In Italy, for instance, the effect of the GZ-spread on real GDP (  ) predates the Crisis 
period and its negative impact (     ) rises substantially during the Crisis period. In Spain, 
the effect on real GDP growth materializes exclusively during the Crisis period. In Germany, 
in contrast, the predictive ability of the GZ-spread at the one-quarter forecast horizon is 
evident even before the onset of the Global Financial Crisis; there is no separate marginal 
                                                 
17. The sample period for quarterly observations of real GDP in Ireland begins only in 1997.  
18. The results reported in Table 6 for the 1998:2-2011:12 period in Ireland are very similar 
to those obtained for the slightly shorter EMU period. Hence the latter are not reported. 
17 
 
effect during the Crisis period.
19
  The economic significance of the GZ-spread and the 
interaction term as predictors of future economic activity is impressive across the board.  
Omitting both variables from the forecasting specification leads to a massive decrease in the 
adjusted R
2
 for all countries but Spain at the one-quarter horizon where the decrease in the 
predictive ability is only 12 percent.  In Portugal, the GZ-spread and the interaction term are 
the only variables that have predictive power over a four-quarter forecasting horizon. 
Dropping both from the forecasting equation results in a negative adjusted R
2
! 
 
 
VI. Conclusion. 
In February 2013, the annual yield on long-term (10-year) government bonds within the 
EMU varied greatly. In the centre, the yield on German Bunds stood at 1.54 percent while on 
the periphery yields were at least double the German yield (Ireland at 3.78 percent), thrice the 
German yield (Italy at 4.49 percent, Spain at 5.22 percent), and more than fourfold the 
German yield (Portugal at 6.40 percent).
20
 The dramatic difference in yields is due to 
country-specific perceptions of risk and underscores the apparent fragmentation of European 
public debt markets which has set in with the beginning of the Crisis period in 2007.  
The current disruption of the European capital market must be put in perspective. In July 
2007, before the outbreak of the Global Financial Crisis, the difference between the highest 
yield on 10-year government bonds (Italy at 4.76 percent) and the lowest yield (Germany at 
4.50 percent) was a paltry 26 basis points. In April 2012, at the conclusion of the sample 
period of our study, the highest yield difference on the same instruments was a staggering 
1018 basis points (Portugal at 12.01 percent and Germany at 1.83 percent).  
In the countries on the European periphery, the adverse developments in the public debt 
market have also spilled into the corporate debt market. Corporate bonds issued in these 
countries have been saddled with a burdensome risk premium which derives largely from the 
riskiness associated with domestic government debt.  
                                                 
19. For Portugal, the standard errors of the coefficient estimates on the first differences of GZ 
and GZ*DUM are highly inflated due to severe multicollinearity. The correlation coeffi-
cient for the two regressors is 0.95. A similar problem, though less serious, applies to the 
standard errors estimated for Germany. The correlation coefficient for GZ and GZ*DUM 
is 0.80 for Germany. 
20. All data were retrieved from the Statistical Warehouse maintained by the European 
Central Bank. Table A1 in the appendix gives an overview of yields on government bonds 
from 1993 to the recent past. 
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In this paper we examine whether the pricing of risk is important for macroeconomic activity 
at the country level. We design a risk-adjusted yield spread and test its predictive content for 
economic activity on the periphery and the centre of Europe. The sample period runs from 
1990 to 2012. Thus, the sample period is long enough to take account of distinctly different 
epochs in recent European financial history. Capital markets in Europe were still very fairly 
segmented and characterized by material borrowing cost differentials at the start of the 1990s. 
The drive towards forming the EMU saw the eventual removal of all barriers to the free flow 
of capital and the convergence of interest rates. The vision to create a single European capital 
market first encountered problems with the outbreak of the Global Financial Crisis and was 
dealt a severe blow when the Sovereign Debt Crisis created havoc in the capital markets on 
the European periphery.  
At the centre of our analysis is a risk-adjusted bond yield spread defined in a cross-country 
context. Increases in the yield on corporate bonds issued in the countries on the periphery 
relative to the riskless yield (calculated using German zero-coupon term structure data) 
reflect the financial market’s unease about the future economic outlook in these countries. 
The cross-country GZ-spread is a barometer of the risk premium that the financial market 
imposes on borrowers. The risk premium rises in all countries during European-wide 
recessions of the recent past, particularly those associated with the Global Financial and the 
Sovereign Debt Crisis. Our findings indicate further that this GZ-type spread acts as a reliable 
signal for imminent and near-term economic activity in the countries on the European 
periphery whose financial markets were shaken to their foundations during the Crisis period. 
The paper also employs the GZ-spread for forecasting purposes in a within-country context. 
For Germany, the GZ-spread has predictive content for industrial production but not for the 
unemployment rate. For GDP its predictive ability is confined to the EMU period.  
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Figure 1: The GZ-Spread in Europe 
 
 
Note: The shaded areas represent European-wide recessions. 
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Table 1A: Summary Statistics 
 
 
Spain Italy Germany Portugal Ireland 
Mean No. of bonds per firm 4.61 4.32 5.29 3.00 4.69 
Standard deviation  4.30 6.91 6.97 4.24 7.89 
Min No. of bonds per firm 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Max No. of bonds per firm 16.00 37.00 35.00 13.00 30.00 
      
Total number of bonds 75 174 330 42 59 
Total number of  
observations 
4,085 8,251 14,953 1,781 2,938 
Total number of issuing 
firms 
17 41 62 13 13 
 
     
Mean maturity at issue (yrs.) 11.81 8.37 6.93 7.1 12.76 
Standard deviation 8.94 6.14 4.1 4.72 11.37 
 
     
Mean coupon 5.45% 5.79% 5.35% 5.46% 10.74% 
Standard deviation 1.73% 1.79% 1.94% 1.09% 24.49% 
 
 
   
 
Mean yield 4.93% 5.59% 4.56% 5.68% 8.10% 
Standard deviation 1.63% 2.54% 2.17% 2.43% 5.64% 
 
     
Median bond credit rating 
(S&P) 
BBB BBB BBB+ BB+ A 
      Series start (all end 
2012M08) 
1996M02 1990M01 1990M03 1999M04 1990M01 
            
Note: Bond rating data was not available for all bonds. Where it was available, the most 
recent rating for the bond (rather than the firm) is reported. ‘Total number of observations’ 
refers to the total number of spreads in each country. 
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Table 1B: 
 Summary Statistics for GZ-Spread. 
1B.1 Whole Sample Period 
 Spain Italy Ireland Germany 
Mean 1.58 2.73 4.13 1.72 
Maximum 6.16 7.54 9.50 4.93 
Minimum 0.36 0.39 0.85 0.16 
Std. Deviation 1.12 1.53 2.29 0.89 
Observations 199 272 272 270 
Sample Period 1996:02-2012:08 1990:01-2012:08 1990:01-2012:08 1990:03-2012:08 
1B.2 The Pre-EMU Period 
 Spain Italy Ireland Germany 
Mean 1.72 3.55 4.63 1.50 
Maximum 3.99 7.54 9.37 4.93 
Minimum 0.79 0.39 1.12 0.16 
Std. Deviation 0.73 1.70 2.60 1.18 
Observations 35 108 108 106 
Sample Period 1996:02-1998:12 1990:01-1998:12 1990:01-1998:12 1990:03-1998:12 
1B.3 The EMU Period (1999:01-2012:08) 
 Spain Italy Ireland Portugal* Germany 
Mean 1.55 2.19 3.80 1.99 1.87 
Maximum 6.16 5.68 9.50 9.53 4.25 
Minimum 0.36 0.42 0.85 0.17 0.93 
Std. Deviation 1.18 1.12 2.00 2.10 0.59 
Observations 164 164 164 161 164 
1B.4 The Pre-Crisis Period (1999:01-2007:07) 
 Spain Italy Ireland Portugal* Germany 
Mean 0.88 1.77 2.57 0.86 1.57 
Maximum 1.64 4.55 5.87 1.69 2.41 
Minimum 0.36 0.42 0.85 0.17 0.93 
Std. Deviation 0.28 0.88 1.16 0.37 0.34 
Observations 103 103 103 100 103 
1B.5 The Crisis Period (2007:08-2012:08) 
 Spain Italy Ireland Portugal Germany 
Mean 2.68 2.89 5.87 3.85 2.37 
Maximum 6.16 5.68 9.50 9.53 4.25 
Minimum 0.72 1.17 3.44 1.11 1.51 
Std. Deviation 1.26 1.13 1.28 2.42 0.59 
Observations 61 61 61 61 61 
*Sample Period begins in 1999:04 
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Table 2 - Industrial Production 
 
Forecast Horizon = 3 months 
 
Forecast Horizon = 6 months 
 
Forecast Horizon = 12 months 
 
   Spain    Italy Ireland Germany  
 
  Spain    Italy Ireland Germany  
 
Spain Italy Ireland Germany 
 
Term Spread    2.32** 0.76* -0.80 2.19***  
 
2.57*** 0.57 -0.62* 2.29***  
 
3.54*** 0.58 -0.29 2.31***  
 
[1.00] [0.42] [0.52]  [0.78]  
 
 [1.36] [0.52] [0.37] [0.79]  
 
[1.09] [0.47] [0.29] [0.90]  
    
  
    
  
    
 
 Euribor -1.46* -0.03 1.05** -1.64*   -1.55** -0.07 0.73 -1.29   -0.97* -0.14 0.48 -1.02**  
 [0.87] [0.36] [0.47] [0.94]   [0.41] [0.31] [0.47] [0.69]   [0.59] [0.29] [0.36] [0.52]  
    
  
    
  
    
 
 GZ 3.23 -0.16 -3.43*** -1.88   4.29** 0.12 -2.66*** -0.85   2.89* 0.52 -1.95*** -0.15  
 [2.15] [0.58] [0.89] [1.30]   [1.44] [0.57] [0.59] [0.83]   [1.64] [0.47] [0.43] [0.50]  
    
  
    
  
    
 
 GZ*DUM   -6.94*** -2.84** -1.04* -3.20   -7.88***    -2.69** -1.07** -2.77*   -7.27*** -2.96*** -0.95*** -2.83**  
    [1.23] [1.25] [0.64] [2.03]   [1.19]    [1.15] [0.46] [1.69]   [1.18] [1.18] [0.28] [1.34]  
                  
InfHome-InfGer  -4.06** - - -   -4.22***        -    - -   -2.29** - -1.32*** -  
  [1.73]      [1.57]      [1.07]  [0.41]   
 
 3 +  4 = 0 -3.71*** -3.00*** -4.47*** -5.08*       -3.59*** -2.57*** -3.73*** -3.62*  
 
-4.38*** -2.44** -2.90*** -2.98** 
  [0.95] [1.07] [0.74] [2.88]   [0.97] [0.91] [0.57] [2.04]   [1.09] [1.05] [0.34] [1.47]  
 
Adj. R2 0.46 0.27 0.31 0.24   0.56 0.24 0.35 0.27   0.61 0.23 0.48 0.35  
Adj. R2 
without GZ 0.29 0.17 0.15 0.12   0.28 0.12 0.13 0.16   0.22 0.06 0.19 0.22  
Obs. 195 255 255 255   192 252 252 252   186 246 246 246  
Sample start 1996M02 1991M02 1991M02 1991M02   1996M02 1991M02 1991M02 1991M02   1996M02 1991M02 1991M02 1991M02  
Sample end 2012M04 2012M04 2012M04 2012M04   2012M01 2012M01 2012M01 2012M01   2011M07 2011M07 2011M07 2011M07  
                  
                  
                  
 
Notes: 
1. All estimated regressions are based on monthly data and include 12 lags of the log difference of industrial production (   ):  
    + =  0 +∑ 𝑖    𝑖 +  1   +  2
12
𝑖=1
   +  3   +  4        +  5(    
         
   ) +   +  
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Forecast Horizon = 6 months 
 
 
   Spain    Italy Ireland Germany 
 
  Spain    Italy Ireland Germany 
 
Spain Italy Ireland Germany 
Term Spread    2.32** 0.76* -0.80 2.19*** 
 
2.57*** 0.57 -0.62* 2.29*** 
 
3.54*** 0.58 -0.29 2.31*** 
 
[1.00] [0.42] [0.52]  [0.78] 
 
 [1.36] [0.52] [0.37] [0.79] 
 
[1.09] [0.47] [0.29] [0.90] 
    
 
    
 
    
 
Euribor -1.46* -0.03 1.05** -1.64*  -1.55** -0.07 0.73 -1.29  -0.97* -0.14 0.48 -1.02** 
 [0.87] [0.36] [0.47] [0.94]  [0.41] [0.31] [0.47] [0.69]  [0.59] [0.29] [0.36] [0.52] 
    
 
    
 
    
 
GZ 3.23 -0.16 -3.43*** -1.88  4.29** 0.12 -2.66*** -0.85  2.89* 0.52 -1.95*** -0.15 
 [2.15] [0.58] [0.89] [1.30]  [1.44] [0.57] [0.59] [0.83]  [1.64] [0.47] [0.43] [0.50] 
    
 
    
 
    
 
GZ*DUM   -6.94*** -2.84** -1.04* -3.20  -7.88***    -2.69** -1.07** -2.77*  -7.27*** -2.96*** -0.95*** -2.83** 
    [1.23] [1.25] [0.64] [2.03]  [1.19]    [1.15] [0.46] [1.69]  [1.18] [1.18] [0.28] [1.34] 
               
InfHome-InfGer  -4.06** - - -  -4.22***        -    - -  -2.29** - -1.32*** - 
  [1.73]     [1.57]     [1.07]  [0.41]  
 
     
   -3.71*** -3.00*** -4.47*** -5.08*      -3.59*** -2.57*** -3.73*** -3.62* 
 
-4.38*** -2.44** -2.90*** -2.98** 
 [0.95] [1.07] [0.74] [2.88]  [0.97] [0.91] [0.57] [2.04]  [1.09] [1.05] [0.34] [1.47] 
 
Adj. R2 0.46 0.27 0.31 0.24  0.56 0.24 0.35 0.27  0.61 0.23 0.48 0.35 
Adj. R2 
without GZ 0.29 0.17 0.15 0.12  0.28 0.12 0.13 0.16  0.22 0.06 0.19 0.22 
Obs. 195 255 255 255  192 252 252 252  186 246 246 246 
Sample start 1996M02 1991M02 1991M02 1991M02  1996M02 1991M02 1991M02 1991M02  1996M02 1991M02 1991M02 1991M02 
Sample end 2012M04 2012M04 2012M04 2012M04  2012M01 2012M01 2012M01 2012M01  2011M07 2011M07 2011M07 2011M07 
 
Notes: All estimated regressions are based on monthly data and include 12 lags of the log difference of industrial production (   ):  
          ∑                
  
   
                       (    
         
   )       
Where        
 
   
   (
    
    
)  h= 3, 6, 12 (forecast horizon) c= 1200 (scaling constant for monthly data) 
1. The term spread  (TS) is defined as the yield on 10-year government bonds minus the yield on 1-year government paper. For each country, the short-
term interest rate (EU) has been adjusted for inflation (Nominal Euribor minus CPI inflation). Inflation is calculated as 100*(ln (CPIt)-ln(CPIt-12)).  
28 
 
The dummy variable (DUM) takes on value 1 from 2007M08 onward and zero otherwise. August 2007 marks the beginning of the Great Financial 
Crisis. INF
Home
-INF
Ger
 is the inflation differential in the home country relative to Germany. Home = Spain, Italy, Ireland, Portugal. 
2. 10% significance is denoted by*, 5% by ** and 1% by ***.  Newey-West standard errors are in brackets with coefficient estimates reported directly 
above. 
3. Sum of coefficient estimates reported may be slightly different due to rounding errors. 
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Forecast Horizon = 6 months 
 
 
   Spain Italy Ireland Germany 
 
  Spain    Italy Ireland Germany 
 
Spain Italy Ireland Germany 
Term Spread -0.43** 0.05* -0.03 -0.01 
 
-0.74*** 0.03 -0.06 0.02 
 
-1.30*** -0.01 -0.02 0.11 
 
[0.19] [0.03] [0.05] [0.06] 
 
 [0.22] [0.03] [0.06] [0.79] 
 
[0.27] [0.03] [0.04] [0.10] 
    
 
    
 
    
 
Euribor 0.26 0.14*** 0.02 0.11  0.23 0.14*** 0.01 0.14  -0.02 0.14*** -0.00 0.27*** 
 [0.19] [0.04] [0.02] [0.08]  [0.19] [0.03] [0.02] [0.09]  [0.11] [0.03] [0.02] [0.10] 
    
 
    
 
    
 
GZ -0.68* 0.05 0.17** -0.00  -0.56 0.10 0.21*** -0.02  0.21 0.11** 0.28*** -0.09 
 [0.40] [0.06] [0.07] [0.06]  [0.42] [0.06] [0.07] [0.08]  [0.31] [0.05] [0.07] [0.09] 
    
 
    
 
    
 
GZ*DUM 1.41*** 0.49*** 0.26*** 0.05  1.45*** 0.47*** 0.32*** 0.04  1.30*** 0.47*** 0.42*** 0.00 
 [0.51] [0.10] [0.07] [0.12]  [0.50] [0.09] [0.08] [0.13]  [0.36] [0.10] [0.09] [0.13] 
 
InfHome-InfGer 0.77**     - 0.31***     -  0.77* -0.10* 
    
0.38***    -     - -0.13*** 0.46***    - 
 [0.38]  [0.08]   [0.40] [0.06] [0.08]    [0.04] [0.07]  
               
     
   
 
 0.73*** 
 [0.23] 
0.54*** 
[0.12] 
0.43*** 
[0.10] 
0.05 
[0.12]  
0.89*** 
[0.24] 
0.57*** 
[0.12] 
0.54*** 
[0.12] 
0.02 
[0.14]  
1.51*** 
[0.27] 
0.58*** 
[0.12]  
0.70*** 
[0.13] 
-0.09 
[0.13] 
               
Adj. R2 0.75 0.41 0.71 0.66  0.75 0.51 0.75 0.55  0.73 0.51 0.78 0.45 
Adj. R2 
without GZ 0.70 0.21 0.64 0.64  0.68 0.23 0.62 0.55  0.61 0.17 0.55 0.45 
Obs. 195 255 255 243  192 252 252 240  186 246 246 234 
Sample start 1996M02 1991M02 1991M02 1992M02  1996M02 1991M02 1991M02 1992M02  1996M02 1991M02 1991M02 1992M02 
Sample end 2012M04 2012M04 2012M04 2012M04  2012M01 2012M01 2012M01 2012M01  2011M07 2011M07 2011M07 2011M07 
               
               
 
Note:  Apart from the definition of the dependent variable all results are based on the same specification of the regression equation defined in the notes 
to Table 2. The transformation of the dependent variable is slightly different:        
    
   
(         ).  The unemployment rate is expressed as a 
fraction.   
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Table 4 - Industrial Production: The EMU Period 
 
Forecast Horizon = 3 months 
 
Forecast Horizon = 6 months 
 
Forecast Horizon = 12 months 
 
   Spain    Italy Ireland Portugal Germany 
 
  Spain    Italy Ireland Portugal Germany 
 
Spain Italy Ireland Portugal Germany 
Term Spread    2.52** 2.43 -0.08 0.75 0.99 
 
3.28*** 4.55 -0.30 0.49 1.73 
 
3.91*** 7.06** -0.05 0.33 2.02 
 
[1.32] [2.75] [0.92] [0.60] [1.10] 
 
 [1.34] [3.20] [0.77] [0.42] [1.09] 
 
[1.41] [3.24] [0.47] [0.35] [0.90] 
                  Euribor -1.25 -2.72 0.58 -1.14 -4.00**  -0.71 -0.97 1.14 -0.85 -3.33**  -0.56 1.14 1.89*** -0.47 -2.79*** 
 [1.03] [1.77] [1.18] [1.21] [1.93]  [0.87] [1.51] [0.81] [0.72] [1.46]  [0.71] [1.59] [0.36] [0.56] [0.72] 
                  GZ 5.28* -4.51*** -5.25*** 5.21 -10.26***  8.35*** -3.10*** -3.49*** 1.89 -3.49  7.16** -1.87*** -2.86*** 1.71 0.62 
 [3.18] [0.58] [1.90] [3.65] [4.08]  [3.19] [0.88] [1.41] [1.76] [2.93]  [3.21] [0.59] [0.59] [1.31] [2.22] 
                  GZ*DUM   -8.60*** -2.36** 0.20 -10.66** -0.96  -10.77*** -2.31** -0.25 -6.40*** -2.52  -9.93*** -3.13*** -0.14 -5.63*** -3.60** 
    [3.08] [1.05] [1.02] [5.35] [1.74]  [2.98] [1.08] [0.74] [2.62] [2.18]  [2.81] [1.01] [0.35] [1.97] [1.74] 
                  
InfHome-InfGer  -5.39*** - - - -  -5.48*** -  - -  -2.72* -     - - - 
  [2.18]      [1.87]      [1.45]     
     
   
 
-3.31*** 
[1.06] 
-6.87*** 
[1.87] 
-5.05*** 
[1.20] 
-5.45 
[3.81] 
-11.22*** 
[4.48] 
 
 
-2.42*** 
[0.90] 
-5.41*** 
[1.41] 
-3.74*** 
[0.89] 
-4.51*** 
[1.87] 
-6.01** 
[2.69] 
 
-2.77*** 
[1.00] 
-5.01*** 
[1.14] 
-3.00*** 
[0.39] 
-3.92*** 
[1.53] 
-2.98* 
[1.65] 
 
 
Adj. R2 0.46 0.41 0.37 0.23 0.33  0.57 0.38 0.39 0.12 0.28  0.60 0.46 0.54 0.06 0.38 
Adj. R2 
without GZ 0.27 0.17 0.24 0.18 0.09  0.27 0.16 0.24 0.12 0.11  0.21 0.13 0.20 0.05 0.18 
Obs. 160 160 160 156 160  157 157 157 153 157  151 151 151 147 151 
Sample start 1999M01 1999M01 1999M01 1999M05 1999M01  1999M01 1999M01 1999M01 1999M05 1999M01  1999M01 1999M01 1999M01 1999M05 1999M01 
Sample end 2012M04 2012M04 2012M04 2012M04 2012M04  2012M01 2012M01 2012M01 2012M01 2012M01  2011M07 2011M07 2011M07 2011M07 2011M07 
                  
                  
Note: See notes to Table 1. For Portugal the GZ variable has been differenced to make it stationary. 
 
 
 
31 
 
Table 5 - Unemployment: The EMU Period 
 
Forecast Horizon = 3 months 
 
Forecast Horizon = 6 months 
 
Forecast Horizon = 12 months 
 
   Spain    Italy Ireland Portugal Germany 
 
  Spain    Italy Ireland Portugal Germany 
 
Spain Italy Ireland Portugal Germany 
Term Spread  -0.58*** 0.09 -0.03 -0.20** 0.05 
 
-1.27*** 0.10 -0.19* -0.22*** 0.01 
 
-1.67*** -0.21 -0.07 -0.28*** 0.07 
 
[0.23] [0.14] [0.05] [0.09] [0.08] 
 
 [0.38] [0.12] [0.11] [0.84] [0.10] 
 
[0.32] [0.17] [0.12] [0.05] [0.16] 
                  Euribor 0.22 0.03 0.02 0.09 0.09  -0.16 -0.00 0.02 0.06 0.14  -0.16 -0.23 0.01 -0.02 0.29** 
 [0.25] [0.13] [0.02] [0.14] [0.10]  [0.18] [0.12] [0.17] [0.13] [0.13]  [0.18] [0.17] [0.18] [0.09] [0.14] 
                  GZ -1.05* 0.28*** 0.17** 0.43 0.38*  -0.81 0.22** 0.19* 0.48 0.15  -1.08 0.12 0.29*** 0.10 -0.35 
 [0.55] [0.10] [0.07] [0.44] [0.23]  [0.56 [0.10] [0.11] [0.39] [0.26]  [0.67] [0.11] [0.10] [0.32] [0.28] 
                  GZ*DUM   1.69*** 0.45*** 0.26*** 0.59 -0.13  1.38*** 0.49*** 0.38*** 0.45 -0.02  2.10*** 0.65*** 0.45*** 0.36 0.15 
   [0.58] [0.11] [0.07] [0.49] [0.15]  [0.42] [0.11] [0.10] [0.43] [0.19]  [0.54] [0.13] [0.11] [0.42] [0.21] 
                  
InfHome-InfGer      - -0.34** 0.31***    - -     - -0.36*** 0.44*** -    -      - -0.28* 0.45*** -    - 
  [0.15] [0.08]     [0.12] [0.16]     [0.16] [0.16]   
                  
     
   
 
0.64*** 
[0.26] 
0.73*** 
[0.10] 
0.43*** 
[0.10] 
1.02*** 
[0.36] 
0.24 
[0.20]  
0.57** 
[0.29] 
0.71*** 
[0.09] 
0.57*** 
[0.13] 
0.93*** 
[0.29] 
0.13 
[0,22]  
1.01*** 
[0.28] 
0.77*** 
[0.10] 
0.74*** 
[0.14] 
0.46 
[0.35] 
-0.20 
[0.21] 
                  Adj. R2 0.74 0.62 0.71 0.33 0.58  0.74 0.69 0.70 0.34 0.46  0.77 0.66 0.76 0.28 0.35 
Adj. R2 
without GZ 0.68 0.33 0.54 0.24 0.57  0.67 0.37 0.51 0.23 0.46  0.61 0.15 0.40 0.11 0.34 
Obs. 160 160 160 156 160  157 157 157 153 157  151 151 151 147 151 
Sample start 1999M01 1999M01 1999M01 1999M05 1999M01  1999M01 1999M01 1999M01 1999M05 1999M01  1999M01 1999M01 1999M01 1999M05 1999M01 
Sample end 2012M04 2012M04 2012M04 2012M04 2012M04  2012M01 2012M01 2012M01 2012M01 2012M01  2011M07 2011M07 2011M07 2011M07 2011M07 
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Note: All 
estimated regressions are based on quarterly data and include 4 lags of the log difference of real GDP (   ):  
          ∑                
 
   
                       (    
         
   )       
    where        
 
   
   (
    
    
)  h= 1, 2, 4 (forecast horizon) c= 400 (scaling constant for quarterly data) 
 
  
Horizon =2 quarters 
 
 
Spain Italy Ireland Germany 
 
Spain Italy Ireland Germany 
 
Spain Italy Ireland Germany 
Term 0.22 1.10** -0.68 -0.02 
 
0.31 1.29* -0.16 0.17 
 
0.75** 1.43** 0.26 0.20 
 
[0.25] [0.57] [0.62] [0.39] 
 
[0.28] [0.69] [0.52] [0.35] 
 
[0.35] [0.67] [0.24] [0.35] 
    
 
          
Euribor -0.26 0.26 -0.24 -0.91* 
 
-0.24 0.32 -0.05 -0.74** 
 
-0.14 0.39* 0.46 -0.59** 
 
[0.18] [0.20] [0.39] [0.5] 
 
[0.20] [0.22] [0.34] [0.37] 
 
[0.22] [0.22] [0.35] [0.28] 
    
 
          
GZ 0.61 -0.48** -1.52*** -0.20 
 
0.73 -0.41* -0.92* 0.13 
 
0.86 -0.37** -0.94*** 0.36 
 
[0.45] [0.16] [0.61] [0.59] 
 
[0.55] [0.21] [0.48] [0.41] 
 
[0.62] [0.17] [0.34] [0.27] 
    
 
          
GZ*DUM -1.71*** -1.13*** -0.81** -1.09 
 
-2.00*** -1.15*** -1.04*** -1.01 
 
2.54*** -1.42*** -1.03*** -0.95* 
 
[0.48] [0.42] [0.38] [0.76] 
 
[0.58] [0.35] [0.30] [0.66] 
 
[0.62] [0.33] [0.24] [0.53] 
    
 
          
InfHome-InfGer -0.71*     - -0.97* - 
 
-0.75* - -0.91** - 
 
- - -0.71*** - 
 
[0.39]  [0.56]  
 
[0.46]  [0.40] 
  
  [0.26] 
 
    
 
               
   
 
-1.10*** 
[0.22] 
-1.61*** 
[0.48] 
-2.33*** 
[0.40] 
-1.29 
[1.00] 
 
-1.27*** 
[0.24] 
-1.56*** 
[0.40] 
-1.96*** 
[0.32] 
  -0.89 
  [0.73] 
 
-1.85*** 
[0.39] 
-1.79*** 
[0.35] 
-1.97*** 
[0.21] 
-0.59 
[0.52] 
    
 
          
Adj. R2 0.85 0.53 0.52 0.20 
 
 
0.85 0.53 0.63   0.20 
 
0.84 0.50 
 
0.84 0.21 
Adj. R2 
without GZ 0.73 0.22 0.24 0.08  0.68 0.20 0.33   0.09  0.59 0.06 0.43 0.09 
Obs 64 80 56 80 
 
63 79 55     79 
 
61 77 53 77 
Sample  Start 1996Q2 1992Q2 1998Q2 1992Q2 
 
1996Q2 1992Q2 1998Q2 1992Q2 
 
1996Q2 1992Q2 1998Q2 1992Q2 
Sample  End 2012Q1 2012Q1 2012Q1 2012Q1 
 
2011Q4 2011Q4 2011Q4 2011Q4 
 
2011Q2 2011Q2 2011Q2 2011Q2 
Table 7 – Quarterly GDP: The EMU Period 
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Note: The 
inflation differential does not have a statistically significant effect on the dependent variable in any of the forecasting equations estimated. Hence the 
coefficient is not reported.                                              
 
 
            Horizon =1 quarter 
 
          Horizon =2 quarters 
 
          Horizon =4 quarters 
 
Spain  Italy Portugal Germany 
 
Spain  Italy Portugal Germany 
 
Spain  Italy Portugal Germany 
Term 0.30  0.86 -0.18 -0.48 
 
0.36  1.61 -0.07 0.18 
 
0.76**  2.38** 0.08 0.41 
 
[0.32]  [0.80] [0.20] [0.90] 
 
[0.35]  [1.12] [0.15] [1.13] 
 
[0.38]  [1.12] [0.55] [1.13] 
 
  
    
  
    
  
   
Euribor -0.05  -0.67 0.13 -0.96 
 
0.03  -0.14 0.07 -0.64 
 
0.03  0.48 0.12 -0.55 
 
[0.18]  [0.45] [0.40] [0.63] 
 
[0.20]  [0.44] [0.38] [0.48] 
 
[0.19]  [0.62] [0.29] [0.46] 
 
  
    
  
    
  
   
GZ 0.35  -1.68*** -1.43 -3.59** 
 
0.69  -1.26*** -0.59 -2.03 
 
0.90  -0.91*** -0.01 -0.11 
 
[0.63]  [0.41] [1.95] [1.70] 
 
[0.75]  [0.26] [1.25] [1.37] 
 
[0.79]  [0.30] [1.30] [1.32] 
 
  
    
  
    
  
   
GZ*DUM -1.33***  -0.90*** -0.92 0.25 
 
-1.81***  -0.89*** -1.44    -0.16 
 
-2.54***  -1.22*** -2.76* -0.75 
 
[0.49]  [0.25] [2.33] [0.56] 
 
[0.60]  [0.22] [1.60] [0.75] 
 
[0.71]  [0.26]    [1.60] [0.78] 
 
  
    
  
    
  
     
   
   
 
-0.98*** 
[0.31]  
-2.58*** 
[0.62] 
-2.35** 
[1.05] 
-3.34** 
[1.67] 
 
-1.12*** 
[0.34]  
-2.15*** 
[0.37] 
-2.03*** 
[0.76] 
   -2.19** 
   [1.16] 
 
-1.63*** 
[0.33]  
-2.13*** 
[0.33] 
-2.3*** 
[0.55] 
 -0.86 
 [0.89] 
 
  
    
  
    
  
   
Adj R2 0.83  0.68 
 
0.21 0.33 
 
0.82  0.64 0.22     0.22 
 
0.83  
 
0.63 0.15 0.15 
Adj. R2 
without GZ 0.71        0.25 0.04 0.09  0.66  0.27 0.08     0.08  0.54  0.14 -0.09 0.06 
Obs 53  53 51 53 
 
52  52 50       52 
 
50  50 48 50 
Sample  Start 1999Q1  1999Q1 1999Q3 1999Q1 
 
1999Q1  1999Q1 1999Q3 1999Q1 
 
1999Q1  1999Q1 1999Q3 1999Q1 
Sample  End 2012Q1  2012Q1 2012Q1 2012Q1 
 
2011Q4  2011Q4 2011Q4 2011Q4 
 
2011Q2  2011Q2 2011Q2 2011Q2 
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Appendix: 
Table A1: Yields (%) on 10-yr Government Bonds 
Date  Germany Italy Spain Portugal Ireland 
February 2013 1.54 4.49 5.22 6.40 3.78 
April 2012 1.83 5.68 5.79 12.01 6.88 
July 2007 4.50 4.76 4.60 4.73 4.59 
January 1999 3.70 3.92 3.88 3.90 3.89 
January 1993 7.15 13.43 12.16 10.67 (July) 9.88 
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Variable Code Description Raw units Frequency Transformation Source
Industrial Production IP or Y Total industrial production index. Seasonally 
and working day adjusted. 
Index (base year = 
2005)
Monthly The log difference over 
one period or log-
difference over h-periods.
OECD
GDP GDP or Y This is real GDP. Seasonally and working day 
adjusted
Millions of Euro 
(2000 market 
prices)
Quarterly The log difference over 
one period or log-
difference over h-periods 
when used as dependant 
variable (see equation (1))
EuroStat
Unemployment U Total Unemployment rate. Seasonally 
adjusted.
Percentage points Monthly None OECD
GZ spread GZ Spread is constructed from yields on bond 
securities and risk-free rate (below). The 
yield to redemption on each bond is 
calculated by DataStream.
Percentage points Monthly None DataStream and own 
calculations
Risk-free rate r
f We construct a German government yield 
curve from zero rates provided by the 
German Bundesbank and interpolate. See text 
for more details.
Percentage points Monthly Not-transformed. Used to 
calculate the GZ spread
German Bundesbank
Inflation CPI CPI all products. Not seasonally adjusted. Index Monthly Transformed into log-
difference over one year. 
DataStream
Short term rate 
(nominal)
EU Short term rate provided by the OECD. It 
consists of different rates over time. It is the 
Euribor interbank rate after 2000. Prior to 
that it is the shortest maturity government 
bond yield.
Percentage points Monthly None OECD
Term spread TS Difference between long and short end of 
DataStream-calculated yield curve.
Percentage points Monthly None DataStream and own 
calculations
Table A2: Data Description and Sources
 
